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I. Introduction
The jury has been hailed as one of the greatest attributes of democracy. Described 
as a “magistracy” by Alexis De Tocqueville two centuries ago,1 the jury system affords 
ordinary citizens  the opportunity to participate in the administration of justice.2 These 
citizens act as the conscience of the community and provide a bulwark against 
governmental oppression.3 The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a 
jury trial, understood preeminently as the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.4 In two 
recent high-profile criminal trials in New York, the right to an impartial jury may have 
been compromised by questionable conduct by jurors. 
Following their convictions in federal court for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, 
and making false statements to government officials, Martha Stewart and co-defendant 
Peter Bacanovic alleged  that one of the jurors deliberately concealed material 
information from his jury questionnaire and thereby prevented the defendants from 
exposing possible biases he may have harbored against them.5 Defendants Stewart and 
Bacanovic also sought a new trial on the ground that jurors considered information 
1
 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-337 (1961 ed.).
2
 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
3
 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)(jury as “conscience of community”); Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)(jury as bulwark “to prevent oppression by the Government”).
4
 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976)(criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury derives 
from both the Sixth Amendment and principles of due process); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362
(1966)(“due process requires that the accused  receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside 
influences”).
5
 United States v. Stewart,  2004 WL 954493 (S.D.N.Y.).
2during their deliberations that was not received in evidence.6 The defendants sought an 
evidentiary hearing to prove their allegations.
In the highly-publicized “Tyco International” trial in New York County Supreme 
Court, in which former Tyco chief executives L. Dennis Kozlowski and Mark H. Swartz 
were charged with grand larceny and falsifying business records, the media reported that 
during tense and lengthy jury deliberations, one of the jurors upon returning to the 
courtroom made a friendly hand gesture to the defendants that appeared to signal “O.K.”7
The same juror earlier in the trial was admonished in a note from the court clerk for 
appearing to nod in approval when the defense had the floor. 8  After the juror’s identity 
was disclosed in the media, she apparently was contacted by an outside source who 
questioned her motives, forcing the judge to declare a mistrial.9 The issue of this juror’s 
possible prejudgment and bias was never subjected to a formal investigation and 
evidentiary proceeding.
The problem of juror misconduct raised by the Stewart and Tyco cases is not 
unusual. Indeed, the issue of juror misconduct has been the subject of pre-trial 
skirmishing in the highly-publicized  murder trial of Scott Peterson in California.10
Although there exists a considerable body of scholarship on the jury system,11 jury 
selection techniques,12 and jury decision-making,13 the issue of juror misconduct has not 
6
 United States v. Stewart, 2004 WL 954493 (S.D.N.Y.).
7
 David Carr and Adam Liptak, In Tyco Trial, an Apparent Gesture Has Many Meanings, N.Y. Times,  
March 29, 2004, at C1.
8
 Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Tyco Mistrial: The Overview: Tyco Trial Ended as a Juror Cites Outside 
Pressure, N.Y. Times, April 3, 2004, at A1.
9
 Jonathan D. Glater, The Tyco Mistrial: The Chief, N.Y. Times, April 3, 2004, at C5.
10
 See infra notes 206-214 and accompanying text.
11
 See, e.g.,  JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994); STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY (1994).
12
 See, e.g., V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION (3d ed. 2001); JAMES J. 
GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION (2d ed. 1990).
3been as closely or systematically studied. Cases and commentaries typically address 
isolated instances of aberrant and prejudicial conduct by jurors that arguably may have 
contaminated the trial. Rarely, however, do these discussions attempt to provide a 
coherent framework in which to analyze the diverse kinds of misconduct by jurors that 
may impair the integrity of the trial and the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial 
by an impartial jury. Nor do these discussions examine in a comprehensive manner the 
available and appropriate legal responses to juror misconduct, and the obstacles that may 
frustrate effective judicial inquiry. 
Part II describes the myriad ways in which misconduct by jurors can contaminate 
a trial and verdict, and the ability of courts to remedy such misconduct. This Part 
examines the case law in which criminal defendants have challenged their convictions on 
the basis of juror misconduct. Defendants have claimed that jurors were influenced by 
external contacts with third parties,14 exposed to extraneous, non -evidentiary 
information,15 engaged in contrived experiments and improper reenactments in the jury 
room,16 made dishonest and misleading statements during jury selection,17 engaged in 
conduct demonstrating bias and prejudgment,18 suffered from physical and mental 
13
 See, e.g., REED HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JUROR 
(1983); Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 471 (1999);  Bobby J. 
Calder, Chester A. Insko & Ben Yandell, The Relation of Cognitive and Memorial Processes to Persuasion 
in a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (1974); Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & 
Cathy Caldwell, The Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors – A Moral 
Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973).
14
 See infra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
15
 See infra notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
16
 See infra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
17
 See infra notes 103-129 and accompanying text.
18
 See infra notes 130-156 and accompanying text.
4impairments,19 engaged in pre-deliberation discussions of the evidence,20 and willfully 
violated the trial court’s legal instructions.21
Part III provides a framework to analyze the reasons for juror misconduct. This 
Part examines  recent developments in criminal trial litigation that have encouraged 
jurors to take a more active role in the proceedings while at the same time protecting the 
juror’s privacy and security. Given the easy accessibility of the Internet, and the attempt 
by some jurors to thrust themselves into the public arena in highly publicized trials, there 
is a heightened danger that some jurors will misuse their power and contaminate the 
verdict. Moreover, strong public policies caution against probing verdicts and exposing 
juror misconduct.22 When a report of juror misconduct is made during the trial and before 
deliberations commence, the trial judge’s ability to remedy the problem is greatest. When 
a report of juror misconduct is made during deliberations, as in the Tyco case, or after a 
verdict, as in the Stewart trial, overriding policy considerations may severely limit a trial 
court’s ability to investigate and remedy the irregularity. As a  consequence, the integrity 
of some verdicts may be undermined by a tainted jury. 
The Article concludes that the problem of juror misconduct is not insignificant, 
and that courts have had mixed success in dealing with the problem effectively. Although 
the quest for the “perfect trial” may be illusory, the ability of some jurors to contaminate 
the proceedings may deprive a criminal defendant of a fair trial by an impartial jury.
19
 See infra notes 157-170 and accompanying text.
20
 See infra notes 171-185 and accompanying text.
21
 See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
22
 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
5II.  Juror Bias and Misconduct
Bias and misconduct by jurors have been demonstrated in several different ways. 
Instances of jurors violating their oath and engaging in improper conduct have produced 
a significant body of case law analyzing the juror’s conduct, the nature and seriousness of 
the impropriety, the extent to which the conduct may have prejudiced the trial, and  the 
appropriate methods available to the trial judge to remedy the problem. The kinds of 
misconduct include the following: contacts by third parties with jurors; exposure by 
jurors to extra-judicial non-evidentiary materials; efforts by jurors to conduct experiments 
and reenactments to test the evidence; untruthful statements by jurors during the voir 
dire; conduct by jurors that evinces bias and prejudgment; physical and mental 
impairment of jurors; pre-deliberation discussions by jurors; and efforts by jurors to 
repudiate the trial court’s instructions on the law. 
1. Third Party Contacts
It is fundamental that “the evidence developed against a defendant shall come 
from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the 
defendant’s right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.”23 Violations of 
these protections occurs when third parties engage in private contacts or communications  
with jurors concerning matters pending before the jury.  The leading case involving juror 
exposure to external influences is Remmer v. United States.24 There, the jury foreman was 
contacted by an unknown caller and offered a bribe to acquit the defendant. Without 
advising the defense, the judge asked the FBI to investigate the matter, and concluded 
23
 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473 (1965).
24
 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
6that the approach was harmless. The Supreme Court remanded for a hearing, holding that 
a “presumption of prejudice” should apply to any extra-judicial contact with a juror about 
the case. The Court stated:
     In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering
directly or indirectly, with a juror about the matter pending before the jury 
is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in 
pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions 
of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The 
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the 
Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that 
such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.25
The Court in two subsequent jury-intrusion cases found inherent prejudice in the 
jury’s exposure during the trial to external influences. In Turner v. Louisiana,26 the Court 
reversed a murder conviction on the ground that the jury was contaminated by the 
continuing association throughout the trial between the jurors and two deputy sheriffs in 
charge of the jury who were also key prosecution witnesses. In Parker v. Gladden,27 the 
Court reversed another murder conviction because a court bailiff who had supervised the 
jury told several jurors privately that the defendant was guilty.28
The trial court’s authority to protect the jury from tampering is clear. When a 
court is informed during the trial that a juror has been contacted by an outside party, or 
has engaged in conversations with a third party about the case, the court has a duty to 
investigate the matter.29  A court should begin the inquiry with the presumption that the 
25
  Id. at 229.
26
 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
27
 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
28
 See also Agnew v. Leibach, 250 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 2001)(defendant denied right to fair trial before 
impartial jury as a result of substantive testimony by court bailiff who had been in charge of jury through 
most of the trial); State v. Merricks, 831 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2002)(bailiff’s improper communication with 
deliberating jury is per se reversible error).
29
 United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739, 760 (7th Cir. 1994)(“no judge could adequately assess [the allegation 
of impropriety] without investigation and factual findings”); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1412 (9th
7jury is impartial.30 However, if a colorable claim of extrinsic influence on impartiality has 
been made, a court may be obligated to investigate the allegation even in the absence of a 
defense request.31A court is given extremely broad discretion to determine the 
appropriate way to handle such a report.32 The more serious and credible the allegation, 
the more extensive an investigation would be required.33 Frivolous or incredible 
allegations may be disposed of summarily. A pre-verdict inquiry generally is preferred.34
However, there are problems with a formal, pre-verdict inquiry. When the subject matter 
of the contact involves a threat or a bribe, presumably by a person associated with the 
defendant, questioning jurors before the verdict may so focus their attention on the 
defendant’s conduct that a jury otherwise capable of delivering an impartial verdict may 
no longer be able to do so.35
When the allegation of an improper contact is made after the verdict, different 
considerations come into play. Courts are naturally reluctant “to haul jurors in after they 
have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct, or 
external influences.”36 Courts also are justifiably concerned that post-verdict inquiries 
may inhibit jury-room discussions, deter jurors from returning an unpopular verdict, 
Cir. 1994)(“Once a defendant has made a sufficient showing that a juror may have been improperly 
influenced, the court must ascertain whether the juror was or was not tainted.”).
30
 United States v. Sedigh, 658 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981).
31
 State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288, 1302 (Conn. 1995)(“circumstances required a sua sponte preliminary 
inquiry by the court”). 
32
 United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 1993)(“in light of the infinite variety of 
situations in which juror misconduct might be discerned and the need to protect jurors and the jury process 
from undue imposition, the trial judge is vested with the discretion to fashion an appropriate and 
responsible procedure to determine whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial”); 
United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(trial court has broad discretion over the 
“methodology” of inquiries into third party contacts with jurors).
33 United states v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000)(district court abused its discretion by failing to 
conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into serious allegations of extraneous influences on jury).
34
 United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d at 759.
35
 United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1301 (2d Cir. 1991).
8subject jurors to harassment,  and burden courts with frivolous and time-consuming 
applications.37 Moreover, by creating uncertainty in jury verdicts, the policy of finality is 
jeopardized.38 Finally, the inadmissibility of juror testimony to impeach a verdict renders 
a factual determination of jury taint much more difficult.39 Nevertheless, some 
investigation may be required, and an evidentiary hearing may be necessary. Here again, 
a trial court is vested with extremely broad discretion to fashion an appropriate and 
responsible procedure to determine whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it 
was prejudicial.40
The continuing viability of Remmer’s “presumption of prejudice” test when jurors 
have been subjected to extra-judicial contacts has been questioned. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that the presumption should not be invoked automatically, but should be 
reserved for instances involving very serious intrusions.41 Some lower courts have 
questioned whether the presumption still exists in light of intervening Supreme Court 
36
 United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)(refusing to allow defendant to investigate 
jurors merely to conduct “fishing expedition”).
37
 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-121 (1987).
38
 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-268 (1915)(“let it once be established that verdicts solemnly 
made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside”). 
39
 Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the “anti-impeachment rule,” states:
Upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any 
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect 
of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to 
assent or to dissent from the verdict of indictment or concerning the juror’s mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a 
juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about 
which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
40
 United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000)(district court abused its discretion by failing to 
conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into allegations of extraneous influences on jury); United States v. 
Davis, 177 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999)(juror’s mid-trial request to be excused from service because of fears for 
his safety, and his revelation that he discussed those fears with fellow jurors, should have prompted trial 
court to do more than merely discharge juror; trial court should have conducted an inquiry into possible 
effect of juror’s remarks on other jurors).
41
 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993)(“There may be cases where an intrusion should be 
presumed prejudicial”); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983)(ex parte contact between trial court and 
9decisions.42 Moreover, even courts that continue to apply the presumption do so 
inconsistently.43 There is plainly a strong justification for applying a presumption in cases 
of  serious jury tampering.44 Such conduct is pernicious, likely to poison the integrity of 
the process, and damaging to the appearance that juries behave fairly and impartially. 
Requiring the government to disprove prejudice in such cases is readily understandable. 
By the same token, applying an inflexible presumption in cases of technical, trivial, and 
arguably insignificant although improper transgressions may be an excessive and 
unjustifiable response.45
If a court does invoke a presumption of prejudice when evidence of an outside 
contact with a juror has been shown, then the prosecution bears the ultimate burden of 
juror reviewed for actual prejudice); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)(“due process does not 
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation”).
42
 United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(suggesting that Remmer test has 
been “reconfigured” by subsequent Supreme Court decisions); United States v. Madrid, 842 U.S. 1090, 
1093 (9th Cir. 1988)(post-Remmer Supreme Court decisions have “firmly established that a defendant must 
demonstrate ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from an ex parte contact to receive a new trial”); United States v. 
Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532-533 (6th Cir. 1984)(asserting that presumption of prejudice has been abrogated 
by recent Supreme Court decisions and that burden now on defendant to demonstrate prejudice). But see 
United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir. 1994)(“As a matter of established law, the burden of 
proving prejudice does not lie with the defendant because prejudice is presumed the moment the defendant 
establishes that ‘extrinsic contact with the jury in fact occurred.’”).
43
 Compare United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 1999)(although juror misconduct or other 
improper juror contacts may require evidence of prejudice to gain relief, jury tampering is a much more 
serious intrusion into the jury’s processes and still gives rise to a presumption of prejudice) with United 
States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998)(jury tampering should not necessarily be presumed 
prejudicial; trial court must first assess the severity of the suspected intrusion, and only when the court 
determines that prejudice is likely should the government be required to prove its absence). See also United 
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 377 (6th Cir. 1997)(trial court required to conduct Remmer hearing only wheh 
alleged contact presents a likelihood of affecting verdict; courts should not presume that contact was 
prejudicial and defendant has burden to show that unauthorized contact created actual juror bias).
44
 United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1994)(allegation that juror was threatened); United States v. 
Maree, 934 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1991)(friends tell juror that “people like defendant should be incarcerated”); 
United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1989)(allegation that judge and federal marshal pressured 
jury to reach verdict); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988)(owner of diner tells jurors “they 
ought to fry the son of a bitch”); Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988)(allegation that deputy 
sheriff tells jurors that defendant has criminal record).
45
 United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. 1997)(“isolated” and “trivial” remarks 
demonstrated no “likelihood of prejudice” to justify assigning to government burden of proving 
harmlessness); United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d  90, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)(“We do not find that the 
circumstances of this case are close to being sufficiently aggravated to give rise to a presumption of 
prejudice.”).
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disproving prejudice.46  A court should consider several factors in determining whether 
the presumption has been rebutted, including the nature and seriousness of the 
communication, whether the extrinsic communication was shared with other members of 
the jury, the manner in which it was discussed, the length of time it was available to the 
jury, whether the communication related to factual evidence not developed at the trial,  
whether it was disseminated before the verdict or during deliberations, and whether the 
communication was reasonably likely to influence the verdict, especially in light of the 
strength of the government’s case.47 The ultimate legal question for the court is whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the extra-judicial contact could have affected the 
verdict.48 If a court chooses not to apply a presumption of prejudice, then the court would 
evaluate the severity of the suspected intrusion, and only if the court determines that 
prejudice is likely would the government be required to prove its absence.49
2. Exposure to Extra-Judicial Materials
A jury’s exposure to extraneous information not presented as evidence in the 
courtroom can contaminate a verdict as readily as third-party contacts.50 When such 
extrinsic information relates to a material issue in the trial, it can seriously impair a 
46
 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. at 229 (“burden rests heavily on government to establish, after notice 
to the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant”).
47
 United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016-1017 (8th Cir. 1995).
48
 United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991). See Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 
880, 887 (9th Cir. 1986)(equivalent of asking whether it can be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
extra-judicial information did not contribute to verdict).
49
 See United States v. Martha Stewart, 2004 WL 954493 (S.D.N.Y.)(trial court dismisses as “idle gossip” a 
post-trial allegation that a juror during the trial received an anonymous telephone call containing 
derogatory information about Ms. Stewart, including information that Ms. Stewart possessed a very 
expensive handbag and the high hourly rates she paid her lawyers). See also United States v. Sylvester, 143 
F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998).
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defendant’s right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. Such information may reveal a 
defendant’s guilt,51 prior criminal record,52 prior misconduct,53 reputation for violence,54
or a co-defendant’s guilty plea.55 Extrinsic information may come from a juror’s personal 
knowledge,56 the jury’s exposure to mid-trial publicity,57 or from official documents and 
records made available to the jury.58 The distinction between intrusions from extra-
judicial contacts by third parties and exposure to extra-judicial information ordinarily has 
no bearing in determining whether the verdict was tainted by the event.59
The nature of extra-judicial information to which jurors have been exposed ranges 
from the very prejudicial to the insignificant. Exposures to external information that 
required a new trial included knowledge by one juror that was imparted to other jurors 
that the federal defendant had been convicted in state court for the same conduct;60
jurors’ pre-existing knowledge of specific facts surrounding the crime and defendant’s 
50
 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
51
 United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1995)(case agent sitting at prosecutor’s table gestures 
toward defendant when prosecution witness asked to identify person who stole money).
52
 Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’d on rehearing en banc sub nom. Jeffries v. Wood, 
114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997); Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 1988).
53
 United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 1995). 
54
 Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1995).
55
 United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 
1979); United states v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Minn. 1996).
56
 Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 393-394 (5th Cir. 2003)(juror tells other jurors that defendant and his 
brothers break into people’s homes); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d at 610 (juror tells other jurors that defendant 
has reputation for violence); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975)(juror tells other 
jurors that defendant had been in trouble before).
57
 United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1990)(magazine article about case circulated in jury 
room); United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984)(magazine article about case left in jury 
room); United States v. Aburahmah, 827 F. Supp. 612 (D. Ariz. 1993)(newspaper left in jury room); United 
States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F. Supp. 1564 (C.D. Cal. 1991)(newspaper left in jury room): Keen v. State, 
639 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1994)(magazine article in jury room).
58
 United States v. Harber, 53 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995)(copy of case agent’s report with opinion that 
defendant was guilty left in jury room); United States v. Luffred, 911 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990)(government 
chart not in evidence brought into jury room); Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989)(police report 
inadvertently left in jury room); United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979)(court file 
inadvertently left in jury room); Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1965)(grand jury 
transcript depicting defendantr’s criminal history made available to jury).
59
 Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d at 1190 n.2.
60
 United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1998).
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connection to it;61 an opinion by two jurors who had professional expertise in medicine 
on whether defendant’s explanation for blood loss was credible;62 and the trial court’s 
acceding to the jury’s request, after the close of the evidence and during deliberations, to 
return to the courtroom to observe the defendant’s ears, which had been covered during 
the trial by headphones used for Spanish translation.63
Jurors also may acquire extraneous information relating to the facts of the case or 
the meaning of certain legal principles by engaging in extra-judicial research. A juror’s 
acquisition of extra-judicial, non-evidentiary knowledge, particularly when the juror 
disseminates the information to the other jurors, may produce sufficient prejudice to 
require reversal.  Moreover, the ready accessibility of the Internet makes such research 
easy, quick, and extremely informative, but also potentially highly prejudicial. Examples 
of jurors engaging in extrinsic research include consulting an encyclopedia to confirm 
that a blood type is rare,64 researching law treatises to ascertain the meaning of legal 
concepts such as “malice,”65 or the possible penalties for first and second degree 
murder,66 and gaining access to a dictionary to define prominent terms associated with 
the case, such as “enterprise” in a RICO prosecution,67 or “callous” and “wanton” in a 
homicide trial.68
People v. Wadle69 is a recent example of a jury verdict being tainted by a juror’s 
unauthorized use of the Internet to acquire information relevant to the case. The 
61
 Titus v. State, 963 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1998).
62
 People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
63
 United States v. Santana, 175 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
64
 Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980).
65
 Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987).
66
 Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880 99th Cir. 1986).
67
 United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
68
 United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 567 (8th Cir. 1988).
69
 77 P.3d 764 (Colo. App. 2003).
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defendant was charged with the shaking death of her 4-month-old stepgrandchild. The 
prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was taking the anti-depressant Paxil 
for stress and holiday season depression. During deliberations, a juror who had training 
as an emergency medical technician told the other jurors that Paxil was a “very strong 
drug” that was “used for people who are antisocial, violent, or suicidal.”70 Despite the 
trial judge’s denial of the jury’s request to consult a pharmacological reference, a juror 
downloaded from the Internet a description of Paxil and the next day read the description 
to the jury. The description stated that the drug is used to treat “mental depression, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and social anxiety disorder.”71
Following his conviction, and learning of the jury’s action, the trial court 
conducted an evidentiary  hearing, and concluded that the juror’s use of the Internet 
constituted misconduct but denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground 
that there was no reasonable possibility that the extraneous information affected the 
verdict.72
The appellate court reversed, finding that the juror’s use of the Internet, in direct 
violation of the trial judge’s order, tainted the verdict.73 The court noted that given the 
sharp conflict in the testimony, the jury may have used the specialized and complex 
terminology from the Internet to assess the defendant’s motive, state of mind, and 
credibility as a witness. The fact that the defendant was taking an anti-depressant, anti-
anxiety medication for panic attacks may have been a determining factor in the jury’s 
70
 Id. at 769.
71
 Id. at 770.
72
 Ibid.
73
 People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764 (Colo. App. 2003).
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verdict.74 Recognizing the problems created by the availability and widespread use of the 
Internet, the court instructed trial judges to emphasize to jurors that they should not 
consult the Internet or any other extraneous materials during the trial and deliberations.75
As in the previous  section, the court’s determination of whether a juror’s 
exposure to extraneous information may have tainted the verdict may require the use of a 
presumption of prejudice. A jury is presumed to be impartial.76 However, when a 
sufficient showing is made that jurors have been exposed to extrinsic evidence, some 
courts will apply a presumption of prejudice, particularly when the extraneous 
information is of a very serious nature.77 Exposure to mid-trial publicity ordinarily is not 
considered sufficiently serious to require a court to presume prejudice.78  Nevertheless, if 
a court learns during the trial that jurors have been exposed to extraneous information 
about the trial, the court is required to conduct an appropriate inquiry, including an 
evidentiary hearing when necessary, to determine whether jurors were tainted by the 
exposure.79
3. Experiments and Reenactments
Jurors do not live in capsules. It is not expected that jurors should leave their 
common sense and cognitive functions at the door before entering the jury room. Nor it is 
expected that jurors should not apply their own knowledge, experience, and perceptions 
74
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acquired in the everyday affairs of life to reach a verdict.80 However, a juror’s 
procurement of new knowledge gained through extra-judicial means may contaminate the 
deliberations and upset the verdict.81 The line between the two sources of information, 
needless to say, is not easily drawn.
Courts are much more likely to recognize as appropriate a juror’s knowledge 
gained from ordinary life experiences. For example, there is no impediment to a juror’s 
knowledge gained from  personal experience that a particular neighborhood is busy all 
night,82 drawing a map to show the location of  buildings in a certain area,83 or describing 
a person’s ability to make an accurate identification from a moving automobile.84 These 
mental processes involve no more than the application of everyday observations and 
common sense to the factual issues in the trial. By the same token, the application by a 
juror, trained as a professional engineer, of his technical knowledge of physics to refute 
an opinion offered by a defense witness also was permissible.85
By contrast, a juror’s deliberately contrived investigation or experiment that 
relates to a material issue in the trial ordinarily undermines the integrity of the verdict. 
Acquiring relevant factual information in this manner puts the jury in possession of  
evidence not presented at the trial and not subjected to confrontation and cross-
examination. Examples of improper juror experimentation include a juror who placed a 
80
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heavy load in the trunk of his car as a conscious way to determine whether such weight in 
a trunk would have imparted knowledge to the defendant of the presence of drugs;86 a 
juror’s experiment in attempting to fire a weapon while holding it in a position consistent 
with the defendant’s account;87 clocking how long it would take to drive a certain 
distance;88 and simulating a witness’s use of binoculars to determine whether the witness 
could possibly have seen what he claimed he saw.89  The same principle that forbids 
jurors from acquiring specialized knowledge through extra-judicial means also accounts 
for the prohibition against jurors making unauthorized visits to locations described in the 
trial testimony.90
The distinction between the proper use of everyday acquired knowledge to 
evaluate the evidence and the improper procurement of specialized knowledge to test the 
evidence often may be tenuous. For example, in People v. Brown,91 the defendant was 
convicted by a New York jury of robbery for having been the driver of the escape car. A 
police officer, the only prosecution witness to identify the defendant, testified that while 
driving with two other officers in an unmarked General Motors van, he spotted a car 
moving slowly with three occupants looking into store windows. When the car stopped at 
a red light, the van pulled up alongside the driver’s side and the officer, who was seated 
in the second seat of the van, looked at the driver for 37 seconds. The police van followed 
84
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the car, and ultimately engaged in a running gun battle which ended when the escape car 
rammed another vehicle, and all three suspects escaped on foot. The defendant was 
arrested later that evening after the police traced the escape car to him.92
One of the key issues at trial was the officer’s opportunity to accurately observe 
the defendant from his position in the van. After the verdict, it was learned that one of the 
jurors had conducted a “test” from her Volkswagen van, after which she told the other 
jurors that it was possible to see the face of a driver of an adjacent car.93 Since this “test” 
supported the accuracy of the officer’s testimony, the defendant claimed that it 
constituted misconduct requiring a new trial. At a hearing on the defendant’s motion to 
set aside the verdict, the juror acknowledged conducting the “test” but said it was not pre-
planned, had not been conducted at the scene of the incident, and was prompted by her 
curiosity to see if such an identification was possible.94 The trial court found no 
irregularity in the juror’s conduct, believing that the juror’s “test” was merely an 
application of everyday perceptions and common sense to issues at the trial, and the 
intermediate appellate court affirmed.95
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.96 Acknowledging that jurors are 
allowed to apply their education, experience, and cognitive functions to sift the evidence 
and reach a verdict, the court concluded that the juror’s conduct was not an application of 
everyday experience but rather, a “conscious, contrived experimentation.”97 Importantly, 
the juror’s “test” bolstered an issue which was critical to the prosecution’s theory, and by 
92
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communicating her conclusion to the other jurors, created a substantial risk that the 
verdict was tainted by the jury’s use of the extrinsic experiment. 
It is likely that the juror’s “test” would have been acceptable if the juror had 
simply represented to the other jurors that her experience with vans confirmed the 
accuracy of the officer’s observation. It is also likely that the jury would have been able 
to conduct an experiment in the jury room, for example, by placing a chair on a table to 
simulate the angle of observation by the officer. Moreover, it is commonly understood 
that jurors are typically much more observant of everyday events when a similar issue 
arises in a trial, and be more likely to engage in unplanned observations or simulations 
similar to the events depicted at trial.98
 Reenactments in the jury room based on the jury’s recollection of the testimony 
are usually allowed as an application of the jury’s common sense and deductive 
reasoning to determine the truth of the facts in dispute.99 The reenactments by jurors 
portrayed in the classic film Twelve Angry Men100 illustrate the use of critical analysis by 
jurors of the evidence based on their knowledge and experience. One of the reenactments 
in the film involved a juror who, based on his experience as an adolescent familiar with 
the use of a switchblade knives, described the manner in which a switchblade knife 
ordinarily would be opened and thrust outward, thereby contradicting a key theory of the 
prosecution. Another reenactment in the film portrayed a juror simulating the time it 
would take for an elderly, crippled witness to go from his bedroom to the door of his 
98
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apartment in order to determine whether the witness’s estimate of the time it took to 
travel the distance – a critical issue in the trial - was accurate and believable.
However, if the reenactment is not merely a more critical analysis of the evidence 
but puts the jury in possession of extraneous information that might be based on flawed 
and irrelevant conclusions, the reenactment may be found improper. For example, a juror 
engaged in improper conduct by biting another juror to observe the resulting bruises.101
Also improper was a reenactment by a juror with machinery that had been admitted into 
evidence but was operated under conditions wholly unlike the conditions relevant to the 
charges.102
4. Untruthful Statements During Voir Dire
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause guarantee a defendant the 
right to an unbiased jury.103 The voir dire of prospective jurors serves to protect a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury “by exposing possible biases both known and 
unknown, on the part of potential jurors.”104 Bias of prospective jurors may be actual or 
implied.105 Actual bias is a bias in fact; implied bias is a bias that is presumed as a matter 
of law.106 Actual bias may be established by showing that a juror’s failed to respond 
honestly to questions during voir dire and that  a truthful response would have provided a 
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valid basis for a challenge for cause.107 As the Supreme Court observed, “The necessity 
of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is 
obvious.”108 Bias also may be presumed or imputed to a juror by establishing from the 
circumstances that the juror is unable to exercise independent and  impartial judgment.109
Proof of juror bias necessitates a new trial.110
There is a presumption that prospective jurors answer the voir dire questions 
truthfully.111 There is also a presumption that a juror’s failure to respond honestly during 
voir dire is indicative of bias.112 Prospective jurors for various reasons may give 
deliberately untruthful answers.113 Deliberate concealment or misleading responses also 
may impair a party’s right to meaningfully exercise challenges to the juror’s ability to 
serve, and ordinarily provide a basis for relief.114 However, only intentionally dishonest 
or misleading responses provide a basis for relief.115 Forgetfulness or honest mistakes, by 
contrast, do not establish dishonesty, and are not grounds for a new trial.116 As the 
Supreme Court noted, “[t]he motives for concealing information may vary, but only those 
107
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reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a 
trial.”117
Determining whether a juror gave willfully false answers is a factual issue for the 
court to determine. Thus, in a prosecution of a defendant for sexual offenses against 
members of his family, a juror was found not to have been dishonest during voir dire 
examination when she denied being involved in a “similar incident,” although she had 
been the victim of a “date rape” several years earlier.118 By contrast, a juror’s failure to 
disclose that she had been married to the prosecution’s lead-off witness, and that she had 
once been represented in a lawsuit by the trial prosecutor was dishonest and required an 
evidentiary hearing to enable the defendant to prove actual bias.119 Similarly, a juror’s 
failure to reveal that her brother-in-law was a government attorney when asked that 
specific question during voir dire was arguably dishonest, particularly in circumstances 
strongly suggesting that the juror wanted to sit on the case.120 Also dishonest and not 
simply inadvertent were responses denying any acquaintance with the defendant,121
denying any experience with explosives,122 denying being the victim of domestic physical 
abuse,123 and concealing familiarity with the case or having discussed the case with 
others.124
The above principles were applied in United States v. Martha Stewart,125 where 
the defendants sought a new trial, claiming that a juror deliberately concealed material 
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information in his jury questionnaire and that his conduct “betray[ed] a pattern of 
deliberate omissions that concealed his bias against them.”126 The defendants claimed 
that the juror concealed a prior arrest and arraignment, that he and his family had been 
sued in court, that his son had been convicted of attempted robbery, that the juror had 
been accused of embezzlement, and that he was terminated from his job for wrongdoing. 
After carefully examining each of the claims, the trial court concluded that although two 
of the juror’s answers were dishonest, the defendants did not show that truthful answers 
would have provided the basis for a challenge for cause based on a finding of bias. For 
example, even if the juror had deliberately concealed his arrest, that fact of his arrest 
would have provided no basis for a challenge for cause because it would not have 
revealed a bias sufficient to support such a challenge.127 By the same token, the failure to 
disclose his son’s conviction would not justify an inference that the juror would be biased 
against the defendants.128 In denying an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the 
juror’s “lack of candor,” however troubling, “in the absence of evidence of bias, [did] not 
undermine the fairness of defendants’ trial.”129
5. Bias and Prejudgment
Apart from showing that a juror gave dishonest or misleading  answers during 
voir dire, a party still may be entitled to relief by demonstrating that a juror harbors an 
actual bias, or that a bias may be imputed to the juror based on the juror’s conduct and 
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the surrounding context and circumstances.130 As noted above, the ability to substantiate 
a claim of bias may be hampered by the rule against impeaching a juror’s verdict,131
which would probably disallow testimony by jurors concerning negative or inappropriate 
comments made by a juror during deliberations.132 In Smith v. Phillips,133 the Supreme 
Court suggested that only proof of actual bias could be the basis for a new trial. The 
Court stated: “This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality 
is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”134 In Smith, 
a juror submitted during the trial an application for employment as an investigator with 
the same District Attorney’s office that was prosecuting the case. At a post-trial hearing 
on whether to grant a new trial for juror bias, the trial court found that the letter “was 
indeed an indiscretion” but that the letter did not demonstrate bias or prejudgment.135
Thereafter, on a petition for habeas corpus, the federal district court granted the writ by 
imputing bias to the juror as a matter of due process, finding that “the average man in [the 
juror’s] position would believe that the verdict of the jury would directly affect the 
evaluation of his job application.”136  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed.137 However, the Supreme Court rejected the conclusion that bias should be 
imputed to this juror, and made the following observation:
[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been 
placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few 
trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror 
130
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impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from th trial 
judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from 
every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due 
process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the 
evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they 
happen.138
Under Smith, proof of actual bias ordinarily must be demonstrated to obtain 
relief.139 Nor did the Court believe that proof of an actual bias would be difficult to show. 
As the Court observed, “one who is trying as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of 
his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.”140
However, the Court’s confidence that a juror can be trusted to acknowledge an actual bias 
may be questioned.141
Apart from proving an actual bias, there is a suggestion in Smith that proof of an 
“implied bias” also may be an appropriate basis for relief in “extreme” or “exceptional” 
situations.142 Such situations might include the revelation that a juror is an employee of 
the prosecuting agency, is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial, or was a 
138
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witness  to or involved in the criminal transaction.143 Other extreme situations that might 
provide the basis for imputing bias include a  murder-burglary conviction rendered 
shortly after several of the sequestered jurors themselves had been burglarized,144 a guilty 
verdict against a defendant announced in the presence of a jury panel about to try the 
defendant for the same crime,145 a verdict against a defendant for the crime of escape 
rendered shortly after several of the same jurors convicted a co-defendant of the same 
offense,146 a verdict polluted by a “shocking” display of a jury’s racial and ethnic 
bigotry,147 and a murder conviction involving the defense of battered-wife syndrome 
where a juror herself had been involved in an abusive family situation.148
A trial court faced with an allegation of juror bias has a duty to carefully 
investigate the claim.149 A court has broad discretion to determine the extent and nature 
of the inquiry into allegations of juror bias.150 Indeed, the failure to conduct a voir dire of 
the other jurors may be reversible error when a juror’s highly prejudicial responses may 
143
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have tainted the other jurors.151 A court has a special responsibility to investigate an 
allegation of racial bias on the part of a juror, and should conduct an extensive inquiry 
that includes detailed questioning of the person who made the allegation and a thorough 
questioning of the juror who is alleged to have exhibited the bias.152
A court has various options when faced with an allegation of juror bias. The court 
must declare a mistrial if it concludes that the jury has been tainted,153 may dismiss the 
offending juror and replace the juror with an alternate,154 and, in some jurisdictions, allow 
the parties to stipulate to a jury of less than twelve persons.155 The judge’s handling of the 
matter is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.156
6. Physical and Mental Incompetence
A necessary corollary of the right to an impartial jury is the right to a jury in 
which all of its members are physically and mentally competent.157 Proof that a juror was 
151
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mentally impaired, intoxicated, or unconscious would appear to cast grave doubt on the 
integrity of the verdict.158 When such claims are raised during the trial, the judge is in a 
position to correct the problem and permit the trial to continue.159 When such claims are 
raised after the verdict, attempts to take corrective action become much more difficult. As 
noted earlier, the courts are reluctant to allow a post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s mental 
state.160 The rule against admitting juror testimony to impeach a verdict is based on the 
several policy considerations: the need for finality of the process, the interest in 
encouraging full and frank discussion in the jury room,  the interest in encouraging jurors 
to return an unpopular verdict without fear of community resentment, and the interest in 
inspiring the community’s  trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay people.161
These interests routinely prevent jurors from giving testimony to invalidate a verdict 
based on allegations that jurors considered prejudicial and irrelevant matters,162 may have 
engaged in bizarre behavior during trial,163 were inattentive during the testimony,164 did 
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 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.493, 501 (1972)(due process requires that jurors be sane and competent during 
trial). 
159
 Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997)(upholding trial court’s removal of dissenting juror 
during deliberations based on juror’s emotional instability); Lee v. United States, 454 A.2d 770, 773 (D.C. 
App. 1982)(judge rejects motion for mistrial but agrees to dismiss intoxicated juror or to recess trial for 
three days).
160
 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. See also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. at 120-121; 
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); FED. R. EVID., Rule 606(b)(distinguishing between 
inadmissibility of juror testimony relating to internal matters of a juror’s mental or emotional state that may 
have influenced the verdict and admissibility of statements relating to extraneous prejudicial information or 
outside influence or pressure brought to bear upon juror).
161
 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. at 120-121.
162
 United States v. Gonzalez, 227 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2000)(information provided by juror that during 
deliberations, several jurors mentioned that it would not matter if they convicted defendant because he was 
charged with white collar crime and would only get a slap on the wrist, and that foreman allegedly said that 
defense counsel always represented guilty clients, constituted incompetent and inadmissible evidence from 
one juror about another juror’s statements during deliberations).
163
 United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 481 (2d Cir. 1982)(juror writes love letter to prosecutor, sends 
her a picture of himself, and invites her to dinner).
164
 Government of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1079 (3d Cir. 1985)(juror claims that hearing 
impairment interfered with his ability to understand the evidence); United States v. Pellegrini, 441 F. Supp. 
1367 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 586 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1978)(claim that juror did not understand English 
language).
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not understand the judge’s instructions,165 or disregarded those instructions.166 These 
policy reasons are often strong enough to overcome post-verdict proof that a juror was 
mentally impaired and to justify a court’s refusal to conduct any formal investigation into 
her condition.167
The same policy considerations supported the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tanner v. United States,168 upholding the trial judge’s refusal to conduct an investigation 
into broad allegations that a jury “was on one big party,” and which involved numerous 
claims alleging jurors’ excessive use of alcohol and drugs.169 The Court rejected the 
defendant’s contention that substance abuse constituted an improper external influence. 
According to the Court, “drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more 
an ‘outside influence’ than a virus, poorly prepared food, or lack of sleep.”170  As an 
“internal” matter, ingestion of drugs and alcohol was within the rule prohibiting juror 
testimony to upset a verdict.
7. Pre-Deliberation Discussions
165
 Davis v. United States, 47 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1931)(rejecting testimony that jurors had not heard judge’s 
instructions). 
166
 United States v. Martinez-Monvivais, 14 F.3d 1310, 1036 (5th Cir. 1994)(rejecting juror’s claim that 
other jurors stated that if defendant had been innocent he would have taken stand); Devoney v. State, 717 
So.2d 501 (Fla. 1998)(testimony by juror that other jurors violated trial court’s instruction not to consider 
certain inadmissible evidence cannot be considered as basis for new trial). 
167
 United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1974)(courts suggests that post-verdict inquiry would 
be allowed if there existed “substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency,” as shown by 
an adjudication of insanity or mental impairment closely in advance of trial). But see Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 
F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1980)(reversed and remanded for hearing into juror’s allkeged incompetence after 
sufficient showing made that juror suffered from mental incompetency during trial).
168
 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
169
 Id. at 122.
170
 Ibid.
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Whereas some courts and commentators have argued that it should be permissible 
for jurors to have intra-jury discussions about the case during the trial,171 it is well-settled 
that jurors are forbidden to discuss the case before they have heard all of the evidence, 
closing arguments, and the court’s legal instructions, and have begun formally 
deliberating as a collective body.172 Judges routinely admonish juries at the outset and 
throughout the trial to not discuss the case among themselves prior to deliberations.173
There are several reasons for this admonition. Premature discussions are likely to be 
unfavorable to a defendant, incline jurors who expressed opinions prematurely to adhere 
to those opinions, impair the value of collective decision-making, lack the context of the 
court’s legal instructions, prejudice a defendant who may not have had the opportunity to 
present evidence, and benefit the prosecution by reducing the burden of proof.174
Courts recognize a distinction between extra-judicial influences on a jury and 
intra-jury misconduct.175 External influences completely evade the safeguards of the 
judicial process, whereas internal violations do not raise the fear that the jury based its 
decision on reasons other than the trial evidence.176 Although some courts have applied a 
Remmer-like presumption of prejudice to extra -judicial misconduct,177 no such 
171
 See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 505 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(citing critics of the 
prohibition).
172
 Id.; United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 688-689 (3d Cir. 1993).
173
 United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1269 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986)(such admonishment a “critical and 
important duty and cannot be over-emphasized”).
174
 United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d at 689-690.
175
 United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 796 (5th Cir. 1996)(“This circuit has afforded trial courts broader 
discretion in dealing with intrinsic influences due to jury misconduct than it has afforded in cases of 
extrinsic influences because it would hamper the judge’s discretion”); United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 
(“there is a clear doctrinal distinction between evidence of improper intra-jury communications and extra-
jury influences”).
176
 United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690.
177
 See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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presumption applies to internal misconduct.178 Trial judges are afforded very broad 
discretion  to determine the method for handling claims of internal misconduct 
discovered during the trial.179 Courts conducting an inquiry during the trial typically 
conduct an interview of the jurors collectively or individually with the lawyers present,180
or interview the jurors outside the presence of counsel.181 However, when an allegation is 
made during the trial that jurors discussed the case, a court’s compete failure to evaluate 
the nature of the misconduct or the existence of prejudice ordinarily is an abuse of 
discretion mandating a new trial.182
By contrast, when an allegation of pre-deliberation discussions by the jury is 
raised for the first time after the verdict, a court may properly refuse to conduct any 
inquiry.183 However, the anti-impeachment rule does not bar juror testimony regarding 
pre-deliberation discussions discovered during the trial.184 Although  court could properly 
178
 United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 796-797; United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954, 956-957 (8yh Cir. 
1996).
179
 Compare United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(decision of trial judge not to 
hold post-trial hearing on claim of pre-deliberation discussions “clearly within that discretion”) with United 
States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.  1993)(abuse of discretion for failing to conduct proper inquiry on 
claim of premature discussions). For other cases upholding convictions despite evidence of premature 
discussions, see Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Weisner, 789 F.2d 
1264 (7th Cir. 1986); United states v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1978).
180
 United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1996). 
181
 United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 336-337 (5th Cir. 1985)(trial court faced with a jury tainted from 
within had broad discretion to interview jurors without the participation of counsel because of the 
“potentially disruptive and coercive effect” of interrogation by attorneys, and court may even refuse to 
consult counsel entirely).
182
 United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 
1974)(no abuse of discretion by trial judge in failing to investigate allegations of musconduct).
183
 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987); United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 1996); 
State v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio 2000).
184
 United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 797 (anti-impeachment rule no bar to juror testimony regarding juror 
discussions dicovered during the trial); United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993)(abuse of 
discretion for failure to conduct more searching inquiry into juror discussions discovered during trial).
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question jurors after the verdict regarding pre-deliberation conversations, a court “is 
virtually automatically justified in declining to pursue such an inquiry.”185
9. Nullification
Jury nullification is understood as a refusal by a jury to apply the law as instructed 
by the court. Nullification has been condemned as “lawless,”186 an “aberration,”187 and a 
“denial of due process.”188  As one court observed, “[a] jury has no more ‘right’ to find a 
‘guilty’ defendant ‘not guilty’ than it has to find a ‘not guilty’ defendant ‘guilty,’ and the 
fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create 
a right out of the power to misapply the law.”189 The dangers of nullification were 
described by Judge Simon Sobeloff is an oft-quoted statement:
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations at to which 
laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of 
conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long 
survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with 
impunity any law which by his personal standard was judges morally 
untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, as 
appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic.190
185
 United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 504; United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d at 956 (judge 
properly precluded juror testimony in post-verdict proceeding regarding intra-jury remarks made prior to 
deliberations such as “this is just a bunch of crap” and “I’ve heard all of this I need to hear”); State v. 
Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio 2000)(no error in court’s refusing to conduct inquiry into allegations of 
improper jury discussions during trial that were raised for first time after verdict).
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 United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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 United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1983).
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 United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d at 494.
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 Ibid.
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 United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969). But see United States v. Dougherty, 473 
F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(“[nullification] permits the jury to bring to bear on the criminal process a 
sense of fairness and particularized justice”)(Bazelon, J.); Roscoe  Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 
44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910)(jury nullification “the greatest corrective of law in its actual 
administration”).
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It is commonly recognized that juries have the power to nullify the law, although 
they do not have the right to do so.191 It has thus been the settled rule in federal courts and 
virtually all state courts for over a century that the jury’s function is to accept the law that 
is given to it by the court and to apply that law to the facts, and that no instruction should 
be given to a jury that it has the power to nullify.192 Counsel’s invitation to a jury during 
summation to disregard the law is misconduct and subject to contempt.193 And jurors who 
engage in the practice may be removed.194
A trial judge has the power to remove jurors who become incapacitated or 
otherwise become unavailable during the course of deliberations.195 Whether a court has 
the power to remove a juror who refuses to follow the law has received much less 
attention. However,  the few cases that have addressed the question emphatically support 
the judge’s power of removal.196 The major difficulty in administering this power is being 
191
 Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)(“the jury has the power to bring in a verdict 
in the teeth of both law and facts”)(Holmes, J.).
192
 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895); United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 
1996); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993); State v. Hatori, 990 P.2d 115 
(Hawaii 1999); People v. Sanchez, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 16 (Cal. App. 1998).  See People v. Engelman,  77 Cal. 
App.4th 1297 (2000)(permissible to instruct jury that it must inform judge if any juror either refuses to 
deliberate or expresses an intention  to disregard the law or decide the case on an improper basis). Pattern 
jury instructions advise jurors not to question any rule of law stated by the court in its instructions. See 
United States v. Bruce, 109 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1997). By contrast, two states – Indiana and Maryland –
have constitutional provisions that require judges to advise juries that the legal instructions are only 
advisory. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133 n.40.
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 United States v. Renfroe, 634 F. Supp. 1536 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
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 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
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 See FED. R. CRIM. P., Rule 23(b)(judge may excuse juror during deliberations for “just cause”). Just 
cause for removal was found in the following cases: United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472 (11th
Cir. 1996)(pregnant juror went into labor); United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1994)(juror 
leaving for business trip); United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 762-763 (9th Cir. 1992)(juror learned 
that girlfriend had been arrested and mistreated by police); United States v. Ruggiero, 929 F.2d 1289 (2d 
Cir. 1991)(juror fearful after receiving threat); United states v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1249-1251 (11th Cir. 
1990)(juror became ill).
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 United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001)(trial court’s dismissal of deliberating juror who 
refused to discuss evidence with her fellow jurors upheld on ground that juror who refuses to deliberate is 
refusing to perform her duty as a juror); United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1997)(“a 
juror’s refusal to apply the law as set forth in a jury charge constitutes an appropriate basis for a juror’s 
removal”); United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 450-452 (11th Cir. 1996)(juror properly removed after 
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able to conduct an appropriate investigation into the allegation of misconduct without 
jeopardizing the traditional rule of secrecy in jury deliberations.197
Since any judicial investigation necessarily requires an intrusion into the jurors’ 
mental processes during deliberations, such investigation  must be subject to extremely 
stringent limitations.198 The often difficult question is whether the juror favors acquittal 
because she is purposefully disregarding the judge’s instructions on the law, or whether 
the juror is simply not persuaded by the government’s evidence.199 The standard for 
removal that has been adopted by some courts holds that “if the record discloses any 
possibility that the request to discharge stems from the juror’s view of the sufficiency of 
the government’s evidence, the court must deny the request.”200 This strict standard 
protects not only against the wrongful discharge of a juror who may be deliberating in 
good faith but also protects against overly intrusive judicial inquiries into the substance 
of jury deliberations. Thus, judges who remove jurors precipitously for alleged 
lawlessness without very good reason abuse their discretion and invite reversal.201
asserting that her religious beliefs led her to to conclude that the defendants were victims of governmental 
entrapment).
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 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
198
 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621 (court recognizes “the often difficult distinction between the 
juror who acquittal he is purposefully disregarding the court’s instructions on the law and the juror who is 
simply not persuaded by the government’s evidence”).
199
 United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001)(deliberating juror who is alleged to be willfully 
refusing to apply the law may be dismissed of there is no “substantial possibility” that the juror is basing  
his or her decision on the sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 
1999)(request that deliberating juror be dismissed may not be granted if there is any reasonable possibility 
that request is motivated by juror’s views on the merits of the case). But see People v. Hightower, 77 Cal. 
App.4th 1123 (Cal. App. 2000)(trial court’s inquiry into allegations of misconduct by deliberating juror may 
continue beyond the point at which there arises “possibility” that the request for removal stems from his or 
her view of the sufficiency of the evidence).
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 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-622, quoting United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). See United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988)(“That a juror may not be 
removed because he or she disagrees with the other jurors as to the merits of a case requires no citation.”).
201
 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997); People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225 (Cal. 
2001)(trial court has authority to remove juror who expresses unwillingness to follow judge’s instructions, 
but trial court abused its discretion by discharging juror whom other jurors accused of not deliberating, but 
who in reality merely viewed evidence in a different way).
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III. Why Jurors Misbehave?
Commentary on the U.S. jury typically attempts to explain the nature of the jury 
system, the role of the jury, and the decision-making authority of the jury.202 Curiously, 
despite abundant evidence that jurors misbehave, there has been little systematic effort to 
describe in a comprehensive way the phenomenon of jury misconduct, the reasons why  
jurors misbehave, and the available methods to remedy the misconduct. There seems to 
be little question that some jurors violate the rules, either deliberately or inadvertently, 
although measuring the extent of these violations is difficult. Extrapolating from the 
cases and anecdotal evidence suggests that jurors have infected trials by harboring 
conscious and latent biases, engaged in conduct in violation of the trial judge’s 
instructions, gave dishonest and misleading answers during voir dire, suffered from 
physical and mental impairments, were intoxicated and otherwise inattentive, and 
flaunted the trial court’s instructions.  Given the policies that seek to preserve jury 
verdicts, there is probably no satisfactory way to entirely eradicate the effects of such 
behavior, particularly after a verdict.203 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, 
invalidating a verdict after irresponsible and improper jury behavior would undermine the 
existence of the jury system.204
202
 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
203
 See Smith v. Phillips, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984)(“there are no perfect trials”); McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984)(“To invalidate the result of a three-week trial 
because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest, response to a question is to insist on something closer to 
perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give.”).
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 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987); McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984).
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The discussion of juror bias and misconduct in Part II provides a foundation in the 
case law to try to synthesize the types of  jurors who are most likely to engage in 
improper behavior. These jurors can be classified in the following five groups:  (1) stealth 
jurors; (2) activist jurors; (3) impaired jurors; (4) biased jurors; and (5) evasive jurors.
1. Stealth Jurors
Efforts by criminal defendants to subvert the jury process are not unexpected or 
unusual. One method to engineer an acquittal or a hung jury is to surreptitiously approach 
sitting jurors and offer bribes or make threats to induce the juror to acquit the 
defendant.205 The integrity of the process also can be poisoned by the voluntary actions of 
potential jurors themselves who seek to inject themselves into the process for self-serving 
reasons. For example, recent disclosures suggest that some jurors have engaged in 
improper behavior in order to be selected to serve on a jury and then to single-handedly 
attempt to undermine the process.206 A juror who engages in such conduct has been 
described as a “stealth juror,” that is, a person who secretly works his or her way onto a 
jury venire in order to poison the jury pool and convict the defendant.207
Given the extraordinary media frenzy that attends trials of celebrity figures, it is 
not surprising that some people for different reasons might want to be part of the judicial  
process. Indeed, some jurors who have served in recent high-profile trials have garnered 
momentary fame in the aftermath of the verdict. For example, the controversial juror in 
205
 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)(describing efforts by defendant to bribe members of a jury); 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1964)(describing efforts by caller to bribe foreman to acquit 
defendant); United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991)(judge properly dismissed juror after 
ascertaining that juror was in state of fear resulting from encounter with unknown men just before 
deliberations commenced).
206
 Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, Peterson Prosecutors Call Any Move to L.A. a Bad Trip, San Francisco 
Chronicle, May 11, 2004, at B2 (describing litigation in Scott Peterson murder
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the Martha Stewart trial who gave several media interviews after the conviction was 
accused by Stewart’s lawyers of misconduct by lying to get on the jury.208 His statements 
to the media after the verdict proclaiming Stewart’s conviction as a “victory for the little 
guy who loses money in the markets because of these types of transactions” were used by 
the lawyers for the defendants to argue that the verdict was tainted by this juror’s alleged 
agenda to convict. Similarly, in the recent Texas murder trial of millionaire Robert Durst, 
a juror appeared on television after the defendant’s acquittal promoting her book, “Durst 
is Not the Worst,” in which she describes her experience on the jury that acquitted Mr. 
Durst of a grisly killing, a verdict that many observers contended was a gross miscarriage 
of justice.209 And in the Tyco trial, a juror made a spectacle of herself by visibly 
appearing throughout the trial to favor the defendants, suggesting that she deliberately 
sought to become a member of the jury for questionable motives.210
This phenomenon of persons seeking fame and fortune through jury service has 
most recently been alleged in the trial of Scott Peterson, accused of killing his wife and 
their unborn son. In requesting a change of venue of the trial from Redwood City, 
California to Los Angeles, Peterson’s lawyers contended that at least three “stealth 
jurors” lied to get on the jury in order to convict Peterson.211 The lawyers argued that 
“[b]y getting on a nationally famous case [these jurors] may have aspirations of working 
their jury service into a book, interviews or some other form of celebrity and possible 
207
 Joel Cohen, Celebrity Jurors, N.Y.L.J., April 7, 2004, at 2 (“stealth juror” worked her way onto jury 
venire in Scott Peterson murder trial); Brian Skoloff, Prosecutors Oppose Moving Peterson Trial, A.P. 
Newswires, May 10, 2004 (referring to three “stealth jurors” who allegedly lied to get on Peterson jury). 
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 See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
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 See Joel Cohen, supra note 207.
210
 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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 See Brian Skollof, supra note 207.
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monetary benefit.”212 Peterson’s lawyers argued that his client’s best chance of getting a 
fair trial would be in Los Angeles. However, describing Los Angeles as the 
“entertainment capital of the world,” the prosecutor argued in response that “publicity-
hungry jurors eager to sneak their way onto Scott Peterson’s jury and frenzied media 
coverage of the case are far more likely to be a problem in Los Angeles than in Redwood 
City.”213
2. Activist Jurors
The jury system in several ways encourages jurors to take a much more active 
role in the trial proceedings. Most jurors use their powers responsibly. Many jurors, 
however, have engaged in excessive, extra-judicial conduct that has the potential to taint 
the verdict. Jurors typically are alerted by the trial court that they are allowed to use their 
knowledge and expertise in sifting the evidence and deciding on their verdict.214
Moreover, whereas jurors historically were prohibited by statute and case law from 
taking notes during the trial,215 today virtually all courts allow  jurors to take notes during 
the trial.216 Similarly, the practice of jurors posing questions to witnesses, although 
discouraged by many courts,217 has been allowed in cases presenting sufficiently complex 
or compelling circumstances.218
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 See Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, supra note 206.
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 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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 Price v. State, 887 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)(en banc).
216
 Esaw v. Friedman, 586 A.2d 1164, 1167-1168 and nn. 8-9 (Conn. 1991)(“the federal courts are virtually 
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 United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2000); State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (M9inn. 2002); 
State v. Gilden, 759 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio App. 2001). 
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 United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1018 (1st
Cir. 1993); United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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Some jurors, however, bent on “solving” the case or trying to test the evidentiary 
hypotheses presented to them, may impair the integrity of the verdict. These jurors have 
abused their function by engaging in extra-judicial investigations and research, in 
violation of the trial court’s instructions, and thereby putting themselves in a position to 
taint the deliberations with extraneous, non-evidentiary information. While jurors have 
the right to use their expertise, jurors do not have the right to conduct their own 
experiments outside the courtroom to verify the testimony,219make unauthorized visits to 
the places mentioned in testimony,220 and engage in extra-judicial research to ascertain 
the meaning of legal concepts or acquire extraneous information relevant to the case.221
Although reenactments of the evidence are generally allowed, some reenactments may be 
unduly prejudicial and may taint the verdict.222
Jurors may also engage in “activist” conduct by deliberately consulting outside 
sources not to investigate the evidence or to acquire extraneous information relevant to 
the case but, rather, to allay any concerns they may have about fulfilling their 
responsibilities as jurors. For example, in one recent capital murder trial,223 deliberating 
jurors consulted their pastors and together with their families read several Bible passages 
relevant to the death penalty, arguably to reinforce their decision to execute the
defendant, and which conduct likely diminished their sense of responsibility for imposing 
the death penalty. Indeed, the pastor showed one of the jurors several passages from the 
219
 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
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 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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 People v. Danks, 82 P.3d 1249 (Cal. 2004).
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Book of Numbers which supported capital punishment,224 and stated that he would 
impose the death penalty on the defendant if he were a juror.225
Finally, juror activism is most powerfully illustrated in the debate over juror 
nullification.226 Whereas jurors hitorically had the power to decide questions of law,227
today the federal courts and virtually all state courts forbid jurors from disregarding the 
law as given by the trial judge.228 Of course, there are two sides to jury nullification. 
Nullification may be an appealing albeit controversial doctrine when used by jurors to 
promote a higher justice according to their conscience. But there is also a “vicious side to 
jury nullification,” as exemplified by all-white juries in the South refusing to convict 
white persons charged with murdering blacks.229
3. Impaired Jurors
Some jurors are physically or mentally incompetent.230 The presence on a jury of 
an incompetent juror violates the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.231
Impairment of a juror may be attributable to many causes: a juror may have a physical 
defect, such as a hearing problem;232 a mental defect, such as a psychological disorder;233
an emotional problem, such as stress resulting from the intensity of the trial 
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experience;234 or an inability to follow the proceedings due to consumption of alcohol or 
drugs.235
Courts face a sometimes difficult task when an allegation is raised that a juror is 
impaired. When the allegation is raised during the trial, the court has the ability to 
conduct a hearing to determine whether the juror has the physical or mental capacity to 
continue sitting on the jury. When the allegation is raised during jury deliberations, the 
judge is faced with the dilemma of determining whether a juror should be dismissed for 
emotional reasons, particularly when that juror may be under stress for being the lone 
holdout juror seeking to maintain her principled position the face of  opposition from the 
other jurors.236
When a claim of juror incompetence is raised for the first time after the trial, the 
claim usually is unsuccessful, largely based on policy reasons against impeaching a jury’s 
verdict.237 Courts are reluctant to probe the minds of jurors once they have deliberated 
and reached a verdict. The well-established “no-impeachment” rule makes a distinction 
between extraneous influences that may have affected the jury and internal matters 
affecting the jury.238 Physical and mental incompetence are regarded as internal matters 
about which jurors are barred from giving testimony.239 Thus, a claim that a juror was 
suffering from a psychological disorder during the trial was regarded as an “internal” 
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abnormality that ordinarily could not provide the basis for challenging the verdict.240
Similarly, a claim that jurors were asleep, intoxicated, and using drugs during the trial 
was an internal matter about which jurors could not testify.241
4. Biased Jurors
In the Nineteenth century, jurors who knew about the facts of a case and had not 
expressed or formed opinions about the facts were considered entirely proper, indeed 
attractive jurors.242 Today the reverse is the case. Commentators suggest that juror 
ignorance is a virtue, and knowledge a vice.243 As the cases suggest, the problem of juror 
bias may be one of the most intractable issues in the jury system. Clearly, jurors who 
harbor actual biases may not serve, and if they do, the defendant’s constitutional right to 
an impartial jury has been violated.244 However, demonstrating a juror’s bias that is not 
actual, and perhaps may even be unconscious, becomes a much more difficult problem. 
The voir dire process is intended to expose juror biases based on a juror’s attitudes 
toward such questions as race, ethnicity, religion, the media, law enforcement, the death 
penalty, and other subjects.
Researchers have attempted to investigate juror attitudes, juror biases, and the 
effect of juror biases on juror decision-making.245 Imputing bias and partiality to a juror 
is hazardous. To be sure, instances occur in which jurors openly express racist or other 
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discriminatory views, and such expressions are usually capable of being remedied.246
Even instances where jurors openly express attitudes that potentially taint the other jurors 
are capable of being investigated and remedied.247 However, given the ambiguities 
inherent is trying to detect latent juror biases, the courts generally restrict the 
determination of implied bias to very extreme situations.248
Courts generally reject claims of implied bias. However, courts have recognized 
that in some instances jurors may be exposed to such highly inflammatory circumstances 
that presuming the existence of a bias is reasonable. Such imputed bias has been shown 
when jurors have learned of the defendant’s guilt in an earlier trial on the same 
charges,249 have been exposed to extremely prejudicial pre-trial publicity,250 have been 
exposed to highly prejudicial events during the trial,251 have a very close relationship 
with one of the important actors in the case,252 was a victim of the crime and is 
emotionally involved in the case,253 and gave dishonest answers on the voir dire to get on 
the jury254
5. Evasive Jurors
Some jurors may resent the intrusion into their privacy that comes form having to 
reveal sensitive matters about their lives and background.255 Other jurors may fear for 
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their safety as well as privacy.256 Typical inquiries of prospective jurors from the court 
and counsel relate to the jurors’ health, personal income, affiliation with civic, social, 
religious charitable, volunteer, professional or business organizations, political party 
affiliations, interest in particular books, newspapers, magazines, or television shows, and 
whether the juror considers himself or herself a liberal, conservative or moderate.257 A 
juror who refuses to answer such questions because they are embarrassing might be held 
in contempt.258 By the same token, a juror who answers such questions dishonestly or 
evasively may, if selected, impair the integrity of the trial.259
When a court believes that a jury needs to be protected from possible pressures, 
harassment, and intimidation, a court may empanel a so-called “anonymous” jury.260
Empaneling an anonymous jury is a “drastic measure” that implicates a defendant’s right 
to the presumption of innocence.261 Virtually every court reviewing the procedure has 
approved its use where it is genuinely needed and properly used.262 One of the problems 
with empaneling an anonymous jury, of course,  is the inability of lawyers to detect 
answers by jurors that may be false or evasive, or to uncover any latent juror bias about 
the case. Thus, a juror who may be reluctant to reveal sensitive information about his or 
her personal life may be able to conceal or disguise such information under the cloak of 
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anonymity, with the result that hidden, even unconscious biases may be less likely to be 
detected by the court and the lawyers.
The controversial juror in the Martha Stewart trial concealed several items of 
personal data that might have been used by the parties to challenge his qualifications to 
be a fair and impartial juror.263 This juror’s false and evasive responses to a variety of 
personal and potentially embarrassing questions suggest that this juror sought to maintain 
his privacy and anonymity in the belief that his evasions would not be discovered. 
Although the court found that his failure to answer the questions truthfully did not 
demonstrate an implied bias, his misconduct in not giving the lawyers candid responses 
clearly disabled them from making an informed judgment as to whether this juror 
possessed the qualifications to be a fair and impartial juror.
IV. Conclusion
The problem of juror misconduct is not an insignificant problem in the justice 
system. Jurors engage in conduct that in different ways deviates from the rules of proper 
juror behavior. Jurors have been influenced by external contacts by third parties, engaged 
in extra-judicial investigations to satisfy their curiosity and test the evidence, gave false 
and evasive answers during jury selection, engaged in conduct that revealed hidden 
biases, engaged in pre-deliberation discussions about the case, consumed drugs and 
alcohol and were otherwise inattentive to the evidence, and flaunted the trial court’s 
instructions. Jurors who engage in misconduct can be categorized as rogue jurors, activist 
jurors, impaired jurors, biased jurors, and evasive jurors.
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Attempts to remedy the problem of juror misconduct have produced mixed 
results. When the misconduct is discovered during the trial, the trial court’s ability to 
remedy the problem is greatest. The court can conduct a searching investigation to 
determine whether misconduct was committed and the extent of the prejudice. When the 
misconduct is discovered during deliberations or after the trial, strong public policies 
usually militate against aborting the trial or upsetting the verdict. As the courts repeatedly 
observe, “there are no perfect trials.”264 As a consequence, however, a verdict of guilt that 
has been tainted by the misconduct of some jurors may be immune from judicial review, 
with the consequence that a criminal defendant may have been denied his constitutional 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
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